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In the Court of Appeals of the District of 
Columbia.
October Term, 1922.
National Association of Certified 
Public Accountants, a corporation, 
appellant,
v.
The United States of America.
No. 3870.
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE.
STATEM EN T OF THE CASE.
This appeal involves the question of whether or 
not the appellant, National Association of Certified 
Public Accountants, a corporation, may be enjoined 
from issuing so-called “ degrees of certified public 
accountant.”
A bill in equity was filed by the United States, 
through its attorney for the District of Columbia, 
under the provisions of section 793 of the Code of 
Law for the District of Columbia, which section 
reads as follows:
Sec. 793. Injunction.— The district attor­
ney may file a bill in the name of the United 
States in said supreme court for the purpose 
of restraining by  injunction any corporation
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2organized under the laws of the District from 
assuming or exercising any franchise, liberty, 
or privilege or transacting any business not 
allowed by its charter or certificate of incor­
poration or not by law allowed to be assumed 
or exercised by said corporation, and said 
district attorney may file a bill to enjoin 
any foreign corporation from transacting in 
the District of Columbia any business not 
allowed by its charter or certificate of incor­
poration, or from transacting any business 
in said District when it has not complied 
with any provision of this code relating to 
foreign corporations; and in the same manner 
may file a bill to restrain any individuals from 
exercising any corporate rights, privileges, or 
franchises not granted to them by law; and 
on the filing of any such bill the said supreme 
court shall have power to issue an injunction 
as prayed and to exercise all the powers of a 
court of equity over the subject matter of 
such bill.
The bill (Rec. p. 2) alleges, in substance, that 
the appellant was incorporated in the District of 
Columbia with four incorporators, and that the cer­
tificates of incorporation set forth that the purposes 
for which the corporation was formed were—
To bring together in one common union 
certified public accountants who are now, 
or heretofore have been, engaged in the prac­
tice of professional accounting; also those 
who, by virtue of education, personal endow­
ments, technical training, and experience are 
qualified to perform the duties pertaining to
professional accounting; to provide for the 
admission of members; and when said mem­
bers shall have presented satisfactory evi­
dence of knowledge in the theory and prac­
tice of accounting, and shall have satisfac­
torily passed the prescribed qualifying exami­
nation of the association to admit said mem­
bers to the degree of certified public account­
ant, and to issue to such members the associa­
tion’s formal certificate to that degree pertaining;  
to safeguard the rightful professional inter­
ests and promote the freindly and social and 
public relations of the members of this cor­
poration; and to do all else incident, appur­
tenant, and germane to the purposes and 
objects of this corporation.
The bill further sets up facts showing that appellant 
was issuing indiscriminately, for the sum of $10 each, 
degrees of certified public accountant, and that, in 
the nine months of its existence, it had issued over 
2,500 such degrees. The form of the degree is repro­
duced opposite page 24 of the record.
The bill concludes with a prayer that the appellant 
be enjoined from issuing these degrees.
The defendant answered (Rec. p. 28), admitting 
its incorporation and the issuance of the degrees, as 
set forth in the bill. It endeavored in its answer to 
allege facts to substantiate its claim that it was acting 
in good faith in issuing such degrees, and that such 
degrees were issued only after a full and careful exami­
nation into the qualifications of the applicants.
The Government then moved to strike out the 
answer and for a decree pro confesso, on the grounds
4(1) that the answer alleged no facts which, if true, 
constituted a defense to the cause of action alleged 
in the bill of complaint, and (2) that the answer ad­
mitted that the defendant was incorporated in the 
District of Columbia, as alleged in the bill, and that 
it was issuing the so-called degrees of certified public 
accountant, as alleged. (Rec. p. 45.)
This motion was granted, with leave to defendant 
to amend its answer, but, defendant electing not to 
amend and to stand upon its answer as filed, a final 
decree was entered enjoining it from issuing such 
degrees. (Rec. pp. 45, 46.)
From this decree appellant prosecutes this appeal.
A R GUM ENT.
I.
There is no authority in law for a corporation organ­
ized under the laws o f  the District o f Columbia to 
issue degrees o f certified public accountant.
The designation “ certified public accountant” has 
come to have a well-defined meaning. It refers to 
one who has had that title conferred upon him by a 
State. In every State of the Union there are statutes 
prohibiting one from using this or a similar designa­
tion, or the abbreviations “ C. P. A.,” unless he has 
been authorized so to do by a State board, in a man­
ner similar to that by which a license is granted a 
physician to practice his profession or by which a 
lawyer is admitted to the bar. The District of Co­
lumbia is the only place in the United States where 
there is not such a statute.
5The statutes of the several States relating to 
public accountants are substantially the same. The 
law of Maryland, as amended by the act of 1916, is 
a fair example of all. (Bagby’s Ann. Code of Md., 
vol. 4, p. 555.) Section 1 of this statute provides 
that a person “ who shall have received from the 
Governor of the State of Maryland a certificate of 
his qualification to practice as a certified public 
accountant, as hereinafter provided, shall be styled 
and known as a certified public accountant, and no 
other person shall assume such title, or use the abbre­
viation ' C. P. A .’ or any other words, letters, or figures 
to indicate that the person so using the same is such 
certified public accountant.’ ’ Section 2 provides for 
the appointment of an examining board; section 3 
defines the nature of the examination to be given; 
section 4 authorizes the revocation of certificates for 
cause; section 5 prescribes the necessary educational 
requirements; section 6 provides for reciprocity with 
other States under certain conditions, and section 7 
fixes the penalties for violations of the law.
The only provision in the District Code authorizing 
the conferring of degrees is found in Subchapter I of 
the incorporation law of the District, relating to 
institutions of learning (secs. 574 to 586, D. C. Code), 
and it was held in Dancy v. Clark (24 App., D. C. 
487) that it was intended that the various forms of 
corporations were to be kept separate. But the 
degrees there referred to in Subchapter I are academ­
ical and honorary, and it is contended by counsel for 
appellant, and with their contention we have no
6quarrel, that the so-called degree of certified public 
accountant is not such a degree as is contemplated 
by that subchapter of the code.
From the form of appellant’s certificate of incorpo­
ration and the number of incorporators it is manifest, 
as admitted on page 1 of appellant’s brief, that appel­
land was incorporated under Subchapter III of the 
District incorporation law, relating to benevolent, 
educational, and kindred societies (secs. 599 to 604, 
D. C. Code). Section 599 of the code sets forth the 
purposes for which such a corporation may be formed, 
as follows:
Sec. 599. Certificate.— Any three or more 
persons of full age, citizens of the United 
States, a majority of whom shall be citizens of 
the District, who desire to associate themselves 
for benevolent, charitable, educational, lit­
erary, musical, scientific, religious, or mis­
sionary purposes, including societies formed for 
mutual improvement or for the promotion of 
the arts, may make, sign, and acknowledge, 
before any officer authorized to take acknowl­
edgment of deeds in the District, and file in the 
office of the recorder of deeds, to be recorded 
by him, a certificate in writing, in which shall 
be stated—
First. The name or title by which such 
society shall be known in law.
Second. The term for which it is organized, 
which may be perpetual.
Third. The particular business and objects 
of the society.
Fourth. The number of its trustees, di­
rectors, or managers for the first year of its 
existence.
Contrary to the statement on page 2 of appel­
lant’s brief that it was permanently enjoined from 
making any use of its charter, the prayers of the bill 
did not seek to prevent, and the final decree does not 
prevent, appellant from operating under the pro­
visions of its charter relating to an organization for 
mutual improvement, inasmuch as, to that extent, 
it is conceded appellant had the authority of the sec­
tion of the code above quoted. But there is no pro­
vision of law authorizing this or any other District 
of Columbia corporation either to confer the degrees 
complained of or to certify that one is a public 
accountant.
A corporation, being the creature of statute, can be 
organized only for the objects authorized by the law 
under which it is created, and can exercise only the 
powers expressly conferred upon it by statute or 
such as are necessarily incident to carrying into effect 
the authority expressly granted. Of course, the con­
ferring of the degrees complained of is not a neces­
sary incident to the organization of a mutual im­
provement association.
A corporation is the creature of the law, and 
none of its powers are original. They are pre­
cisely what the incorporating act has made 
them, and can only be exerted in the manner 
which the act authorizes. In other words, the 
State prescribes the purposes of a corporation 
and the means of executing those purposes.
8Purposes and means are within the State’s 
control.
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 
28, 43.
See also
Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman’s Car 
Co., 139 U. S. 24, 48, 49.
Oregon Railway Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 
130 U. S. 1.
This rule should be applied with the utmost strict­
ness where a corporation, as here, is assuming to 
confer a designation of a public character.
While the District of Columbia possesses no 
statute prohibiting one from designating himself as 
a certified public accountant, or, as more commonly 
abbreviated, a “ C. P. A.,”  that term, when used 
by an accountant in the District of Columbia, has 
come to mean that some State has certified that he is 
possessed of superior education and skill, and is of 
good moral character. Therefore, a resident of the 
District, in employing an accountant, would be 
guided in his selection to one possessing such a cer­
tificate. But this designation becomes valueless in 
this District, if this appellant be permitted to confer 
upon those whom it sees fit, the degree complained of.
In this connection the letter from the appellant to 
Harry W. Bundy (Rec. p. 15) is of interest. There 
it is said:
We have adopted the following designation 
for signature of members of the national asso­
ciation outside of the District of Columbia, 
C. P. A. (N. A.).
9In other words, this appellant instructs its mem­
bers practicing accountancy in the States to add to 
the abbreviation “ C. P. A .”  the letters ( “ N. A .” ), 
which stand, of course, for national association, in 
the hope that thereby its members can improperly 
receive credit from the public for having passed a 
State board, and at the same time, upon a techni­
cality, escape prosecution for violation of the State 
laws. But its members doing business in the Dis­
trict are advised that they may, with impunity, by 
virtue of this so-called degree, hold themselves out 
as certified public accountants.
I I .
Appellant acquired no right to issue the degrees 
com plained o f  by virtue o f the recording o f  its 
charter.
It is contended by counsel for appellant that, 
when the recorder of deeds accepted for filing and 
recording the certificate of incorporation containing 
the clause relating to the issuance of degrees of cer­
tified public accountant, that certificate became a 
contract between appellant and the United States 
which can not be attacked in this proceeding. Had 
the recorder refused to accept the whole certificate 
for filing, because of the objectionable provision, he 
would have been well within his rights.
In the case of Dancy v. Clark, 24 App. D. C. 487, 
a certificate was presented to the recorder of deeds 
for the incorporation under subchapter 4 of the 
incorporation law of the District (secs. 605 to 644,
20254—22------2
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D. C. Code) of a company to engage in a number of 
forms of businesses. The recorder refused to accept 
the certificate, and a proceeding was brought for a 
writ of mandamus to compel him to receive the 
certificate. This court, holding that a corporation 
could be formed for only one of the purposes enu­
merated in subchapter 4, refused the writ.
That the recorder of deeds, in the press of business, 
failed to notice the improper part of appellant’s 
certificate of incorporation, and accepted and re­
ceived the same, does not create a valid contract 
between appellant and the United States. A con­
tract entered into in violation of law is void.
In the case of Oregon Railway Co. v. Oregonian 
Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1, the court said:
Of course any authority for the exercise of 
corporate powers, derived from the laws of 
Oregon, must be in accord with the constitu­
tion of that State and its statutes upon that 
subject. * * * It is idle to say, therefore, 
that any corporation could assume to itself 
powers of action by the mere declaration in its 
articles or memorandum that it possessed 
them.
In the Dancy case, this court said:
Consequently, even if a paper appears to 
have been regularly executed so as to entitle it 
to record, and the recorder had exceeded his 
authority in refusing to receive and record it, 
yet the court will not, by the writ of man­
damus, coerce his action, if it appears upon 
consideration of the contents of the paper that
11
it is invalid in law, for, in that event, to coerce 
his action and to command his receipt of the 
paper would be a nugatory thing in law.
In the same case, the court, referring to a situation 
where, as here, a certificate of incorporation con­
taining objectionable features had actually been re­
ceived and filed, said:
In such cases the certificate is upheld so far 
as it is valid, and the illegal parts, if any, are 
disregarded.
And in the case of American Elementary Electric Co. 
v. Normandy, 46 App. D. C. 329, this court said:
That the articles of incorporation of the Dis­
trict company were voidable is clear under the 
decision of this court in Dancy v. Clark, 24 
App. D. C. 487. A corporation many not be 
lawfully formed here to accomplish all the ob­
jects enumerated in those articles, and no 
primary purpose is expressed, nor is one de­
ducible from the language used. Consequently 
the objects enumerated must be viewed as a 
whole, and, when so viewed, it is apparent 
that there was no warrant in law for the incor­
poration.
As before pointed out, all that the Government 
prayed in this proceeding, and all that the final de­




Appellant’ s schem e is fraudulent.
In the view we take of this case, since appellant 
is assuming to exercise corporate privileges without 
authority of law, it is immaterial whether or not it is 
so acting in good faith. However, the bad faith of 
appellant should not pass unnoticed. A reading of 
the conceded facts in the record of this case can not 
but be convincing that appellant’s whole scheme in 
issuing the so-called degrees of certified public 
accountant is a fraudulent one: First, to aid the un­
scrupulous person under some semblance of right to 
represent to the public that he possesses the necessary 
qualifications as to education, ability, and character 
to be certified by a State as a public accountant; and, 
second, to induce the innocent person to part with the 
sum of $10 in return for a worthless sheet of paper 
purporting to confer upon him the degree of certified 
public accountant, with “ all the honors, rights, and 
privileges to that degree appertaining,”  in the belief 
that he is receiving something of value. Appellant 
represented, and it is not denied (see letter to Morris, 
Rec. p. 10),that “ The association is duly incorporated 
under the laws of the District of Columbia, and by this 
law we are empowered to admit members of the degree 
of C. P. A. and issue to them the certificate of the 
National Association C. P. A.”
The two letters from appellant to Harry W. Bundy 
(Rec. pp. 15, 16, and 17), which are not denied in 
the answer, present a striking example of appellant’s
13
lack of good faith. The first letter, dated December 
24, 1921, advises Bundy that “ the board of exami­
ners of the national association have passed favor­
ably on your application,”  and “ on December 24th 
we sent you your membership certificate, to be deliv­
ered to you by the American Railway Express Com­
pany.” Just why the express should have been 
resorted to instead of the more convenient method 
of the mail is hard to explain, except upon the 
theory that the officers of appellant corporation 
knew they were engaged in a fraudulent scheme and 
hoped, if possible, to evade prosecution for using the 
mails to defraud. The certificate referred to in the 
letter (Rec. pp. 15 and 16) recites that Bundy had 
“ presented satisfactory evidence as to his knowl­
edge of the theory, science, and practice of account­
ancy” or had “ passed the prescribed examination,” 
and “ upon him is conferred the degree of certified 
public accountant, with all of the honors, rights, 
and privileges to that degree appertaining.” Appar­
ently something occurred after the writing of this 
letter and the expressing of the certificate to place 
the officers of appellant corporation upon their 
guard, and they followed it, on December 28th, with 
another letter reading, in part, as follows:
After careful investigation the board of 
examiners and the board of governors of this 
organization have arrived at the conclusion 
that while you do not meet the standards set 
for our members, yours is a worthy case, and 
in order that you will be given an incentive
14
to greater effort so as to perfect yourselves in 
accountancy and to hold up the standards of 
this profession and to raise if possible the 
standards now produced, we have decided to 
accept you as a member and to urge upon 
you the necessity of continually striving to 
perfect your knowledge of the theory and prac­
tice of the profession.
We request and urgently urge you to re­
strain from using your title or from attempt­
ing to practice the profession until such time 
as you know that you are sufficiently qualified 
to meet the demands which may be made upon 
you.
Stripped of its camouflage and self-serving declara­
tions, this letter is a plain admission that appellant 
conferred its so-called degree of certified public 
accountant upon one whom it knew was not qualified 
as an accountant. Another instance of bad faith is 
that, while in this letter appellant urgently requests 
Bundy not to make use of the title bestowed upon 
him, it addresses him as “ Mr. Harry W. Bundy, 
C. P. A. (N. A .).”
That appellant corporation was organized solely 
for the purpose of selling the degrees complained of 
is apparent from the assertion of counsel for appel­
lant on page 2 of their brief that a final decree was 
entered “ permanently enjoining appellant from mak­
ing any use of its charter.”  Inasmuch as such relief 
was neither prayed nor granted, counsel’s statement 
can be justified only upon the theory that the only 
portion of the charter which appellant regarded as of
15
any value, and the only portion used or intended to 
be used, is that which relate s to the issuance of these 
degrees. The clauses of the charter providing for an 
organization for mutual improvement were undoubt­
edly inserted to conceal the real object of the cor­
poration from the watchful eye of the recorder of 
deeds. Nor is it surprising that appellant values the 
objectionable provision above all others when we 
consider that in the nine months of its existence 
before the filing of this suit it had sold over 2,500 of 
its worthless degrees at $10 each. Surely such an 
income-producing charter provision is not to be 
treated lightly.
IV.
A m otion  to strike is the proper procedure to test the 
sufficiency o f  an answer.
It is conceded that prior to the new equity rules the 
only method provided for testing the sufficiency of an 
answer was by setting the case down for hearing upon 
bill and answer. This was because the answer was 
more than a pleading— it was evidence for the de­
fendant. But equity rule No. 10 of the Rules of 
Practice of the Supreme Court of the District pro­
vides:
The verification of a pleading does not apply 
to the amount claimed except in an action 
founded on contract, express or implied, for 
the payment of money only; and verification 
shall not make other or greater proof necessary 
on the side of the adverse party.
16
Thus, it will be seen, an answer has lost its eviden­
tiary character, and has become a mere pleading.
Equity rule No. 39 of the Supreme Court of the 
District (which is identical with rule 33 of the Federal 
Equity Rules) provides as follows:
Exceptions for insufficiency of an answer are 
abolished. But if an answer set up an affirma­
tive defense, set-off, or counterclaim, the 
plaintiff may, upon five days’ notice, or such 
further time as the court may allow, test the 
sufficiency of the same by motion to strike out. 
If found insufficient but amendable, the court 
may allow an amendment upon terms or strike 
out the matter.
The practice adopted in this case has been followed 
and approved in a number of cases in the Supreme 
Court of the District. On page 95 of the record in 
the case of Federal Trade Commission v. Claire 
Furnace Co. et al., No. 3798 in this court, will be 
found an opinion by Mr. Justice Bailey sustaining 
this practice, the material portions of which opinion 
read as follows:
Under the rules and practice in equity prior 
to the present rules there is no question but 
that no demurrer to an answer would he, nor 
was there any way of testing the sufficiency 
of an answer as a defense but by setting down 
the case for hearing on bill and answer. An 
answer was evidence as well as a pleading; and 
on hearing on bill and answer, the answer 
being evidence, the hearing was final. Even 
where the bill waived an answer under oath, 
and an unverified answer was filed, the same
17
rule was followed where the hearing was on 
bill and answer. This was expressly provided 
for in the rules of the United States Supreme 
Court. (Equity rule 41.)
“ If the complainant in his bill shall waive 
an answer under oath, * * * the answer 
of the defendant, though under oath, * * * 
shall not be evidence in his favor unless the 
cause be set for hearing on bill and answer 
only * * *."
This provision of the former rules was not 
carried into the present rules. An answer, 
although verified (excluding answers to inter­
rogatories), is no longer evidence. While the 
sufficiency of a plea (which was never evi­
dence) could be tested by setting it down for 
argument, under the new rules the matter of 
a plea must be incorporated in the answer and 
the plea becomes a part of the answer.
In my opinion, by analogy to the former 
practice in regard to pleas, the sufficiency of 
the matters of both pleas and answers as 
defenses may be tested by proceedings in the 
nature of setting down the same for argument 
or by a motion to strike, the latter being more 
in accordance with the present methods of 
testing the sufficiency of bills and cross claims. 
In Shera v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 237 Fed. 
484, the same view of the present practice is 
taken.
In the case of Shera v. Merchants Life Ins. Co., 237 
Fed. 484, the court said:
(1) Under previous equity rules, upon sub­
mission upon bill and answer, the answer
18
became evidence— “ the only evidence that 
defendant needs, for it must be taken as true 
in all respects.”  Harris Reynolds v. First 
National Bank, 112 U. S. 405. The present 
equity rules do not seem to contemplate the 
submission of a case upon bill and answer; 
they seem rather to direct that the suffi­
ciency of the answer as a defense, in view of 
the averments of the bill of complaint, shall 
be raised by motion to strike. (Equity rule 
33.)
This procedure was impliedly recognized by this 
court in Phillips v. Noel Construction Co., 49 App. 
D. C. 379, where it is said:
But this is denied by said defendants in 
their answer, which has to be taken as true 
under the course the plaintiffs have seen fit 
to pursue in presenting their case; that is, 
by their motion to strike out and electing to 
stand upon that motion when overruled.
This practice is one which should meet with the 
approval of this court. It furnishes an expeditious 
and inexpensive method of securing justice to a 
plaintiff with a meritorious case. It clears the trial 
calendar of cases in which no sufficient defense has 
been interposed, without depriving the defendant 
of any right he might otherwise have. Certainly, 
if a defendant is unable to allege a defense, he would 
be unable to prove one.
It is impossible to conceive of any injury resulting 
to appellant by reason of the adoption of this pro­
cedure. To sustain this decree, it is only necessary
19
to find the existence of two facts— (1) that appellant 
was incorporated in the District of Columbia as 
alleged and (2) that it was issuing the degrees com­
plained of— both of which facts are admitted by the 
answer. Had the Government elected to calendar 
the case for trial, and a trial been had, no evidence 
need have been offered, since all of the material alle­
gations of the bill are admitted. Appellant was 
given an opportunity to amend, which it declined, 
electing to stand upon its answer as filed. What 
advantage could appellant have gained other than 
delay had the Government been required to proceed 
to trial? As all of the material facts of the case 
were before the court and undisputed, a final decree 
was appropriate.
CONCLUSION.
It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the 
court below should be affirmed.
Peyton Gordon,
United States Attorney.
Vernon E. West, 
Assistant United States Attorney.
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